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From experience to gift1. 
Reflections on life as disclosed to consciousness
Part 1
“We had the experience but missed the meaning, 
And approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form, beyond any meaning 
We can assign to happiness.”
(T. S. Eliot, selection from Dry Savages, from Four Quartets)
There is hardly a more mys‑
terious phenomenon than life. 
Any philosophical prise de con­
science that tries to avoid reduc‑
ing life to the natural sphere has 
to avoid the common mistake of 
objectifying it, that is, of taking 
life as something, as a property 
of being. A more justified phe‑
nomenological approach that 
remains open to the supernat‑
ural character of life would fo‑
cus rather on how life is given 
to consciousness. The starting 
 1 I own many thanks for cor‑
recting this essay and making many sug‑
gestions to its improvement to Dr. Aaron 
Riches, Dr. John Corrigan and Dr. William 
Hackett.
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point for my analysis is the observation that before life is thematically 
given as such it is somehow always already disclosed in any conscious 
experience. Life gives itself in a tacit and discreet way. Not only are we 
already alive before we turn to life, but we also understand life before we 
look at it as a meaningful phenomenon.
In this meditation I offer an itinerary: from the point of a deepened 
understanding of the silent disclosure of life, towards a reflected recog‑
nition of life as divine gift.
Before any philosophical investigation begins, the first impediment 
itself present in the drama of life that one must overcome is evil. The phe‑
nomenon of life is overshadowed by evil and its meaning is fragmented.
Life remains unperceived in those experiences that are not themati‑
cally concerned with life as such. It is an explicitly phenomenological 
task to discover those formal aspects that reveal the nature of life in all 
conscious events prior to any ‘experience’ in the full sense. Investigating 
the process of transforming a ‘conscious flux’ as an immediate and yet 
unreflected experience to a reflected one with an already clarified spe‑
cific meaning is indispensable to see how life that is originally given re‑
mains unnoticed until it is manifested in experiences through which it is 
thematically given. These latter experiences – given that they only show 
some aspect of life, and that also only in a specific context – need to be 
carefully reflected about in order to encounter in them life as such and 
not just some reduced sense of life.
In what follows I will establish three types or modes of explicitly ex‑
periencing life that are relevant in this sense. I shall also investigate the 
different modes of reduction of the originally given life to experience.
These preparatory reflections are to be continued as a more profound 
philosophical and existential endeavor. In the second part of this essay 
(that is going to be published as a separate article) I argue that the main 
content of these three modes of how life “gives itself from itself ”2 has to 
 2 See especially to this question the introductory chapter C. Der Vorbegriff der Phäno­
menologie of Being and time in which Heidegger offers the following definition of phenomenolo‑
gy: “Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.” In 
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be traced back to the original encounter with life, i.e. in the divine per‑
son that calls himself Life.
1. The overwhelming presence of evil as an impediment 
to consider life as such
How may one talk about life as gift in what Hölderlin calls a hollow age 
(in dürftiger Zeit3)? Images of all kinds of evil, far beyond mere escha‑
tological fantasies, truly permeate our everyday life. Recovering not just 
the idea but also the existential approach to life as gift becomes extremely 
problematic. Can one still contemplate more than just single events, life 
as such in terms of gift when overwhelmed with representations of evil 
that vindicate the right to be the ultimate word on nature and the su‑
pernatural? Through the media, in addition to our individual suffering 
caused by failure, fault and sin, sickness and death, we are confronted 
with an immense amount of examples announcing the tragic aspects of 
life. Evil is reported, documented and explored in all details and the im‑
ages of a suffering mankind add up to a hopeless eschatological vision 
of life. Even for somebody who rejects a Theo ‑centric thinking and thus 
sustains that man is the measure of all, this vision of a final catastrophe 
cannot be considered any more in terms of a possible scenario, avoidable 
through human effort and science; the false optimism of modernity is 
confuted by our daily experience. Beyond a mere fearful future ‑projection 
of the human mind the tragic end of all is rather depicted as something 
that is dormant in the womb of the world unceasingly threatening and 
corrupting nature by making it irrational and inhuman: radical evil is 
predicted to exist.
And yet the contemporary representation of evil does not silence or 
abolish philosophy as a careful, imaginative and yet systematic reflection 
this very sense the present reflection tries to realize the maxim of phenomenology formulated by 
Husserl: “going back to things in themselves.” See: Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit, Hrsg. T. Rentsch, 
[Berlin] 2015 (Klassiker Auslegen, 25).
 3 See F. Hölderlin: “Wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?“ (Brot und Wein [1800–1801]); see 
further K. Löwith, Heidegger – Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Stuttgart 1983.
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on the nature of life. One reason for it is that no image is able to give an 
exhaustive account of its content; rather it refers to something entirely 
transcendent to itself. Can a manifestation of evil refer then to life as 
such?
Evil as concrete givenness is part of life and the event by which it 
comes to the fore is undoubtedly real, and yet its meaning resists any at‑
tempt to be equaled to the meaning of life as such. Some events of life can 
rightly appear as bearing some character of evil, but there is no logical 
or ontological justification for saying that life is evil in itself, for no ‘evil 
event’ can truly represent the essence of life, the full meaning of what 
life really is. Rather, evil as such contradicts life in its full sense; or to be 
more precise: evil is privatio vitae. Evil, experienced in whatever form, as 
sin, failure, error, natural catastrophe, or death is a final datum, a given‑
ness in and by which life as a ‘continuous self ‑giving of being’4 comes 
to a dead ‑end; it becomes merely factual (factum) and lifeless, like the 
shed skin of a serpent.
What we perceive as evil namely, we do so, precisely because it does not 
fulfill our expectations towards a full life.5 Between – on the one hand – 
our natural desire to fully realize the meaning of life and – on the other 
hand – life as it is given in events over and against our concrete expecta‑
tions, there is always a tension that sometimes becomes abysmal. Events 
considered to be tragic rather than just dramatic, however, do not stop 
to refer to the full meaning of life; on the contrary, they give testimony 
of the telling presence of its absence. An event is considered to be tragic 
or it is qualified as suffering or evil exactly because it does not express in 
all clarity the full fletched meaning of life which is still recalled, precisely 
because it is overshadowed and obfuscated.
 4 It would be more appropriate to say: life as a renewed gift, but I’d like to introduce this 
notion later.
 5 St. Bonaventure makes a similar point when noting that the finite cannot be recog‑
nized as finite without knowledge of the infinite. See: De myst. Trinit., 1. 1, 10–20 (in: Opera om­
nia, vol. 5, Quaracchi, 1891, p. 46f.); in Hexaem., vv. 30 and 32 (in: Opera omnia, vol. 5, Quaracchi, 
1891, collatio 5, p. 359). See other citations and more  exact references in E. Gilson, Die Philosophie 
des hl. Bonaventura, Köln–Olten 19602, chap. 3, p. 137ff.; p. 586–587 (nn. 15–17).
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The ‘omnipresent’ evil as a data – as far as it invokes the full meaning 
of life – thus prompts us to ‘deepening reflection’. Moreover, just as the 
‘sublime beauty’ calls for reflection that by transcending the aesthetical 
sphere is of metaphysical concern and even of theological relevance, the 
‘negative sublime’6 provoked by the immensity of evil, requires more 
than a mere scientific, or even a mere philosophical approach to life. It 
gives rise to questions that encompass the entire sphere of reality both, 
in its natural and supernatural aspects. Philosophy confronted with the 
overwhelming presence of evil would be unfaithful to its own vocation 
by excluding theological considerations on eschatology and redemption 
for it would restrict itself to a mere analyses of the data within life instead 
of life as such. All evil and suffering would be thereby banished to the 
natural sphere deprived of all supernatural relevance. It is reasonable 
to concentrate on the mere givenness life in order to circumscribe the 
datum of the phenomenon (what it is); but this certainly leaves open the 
more profound question concerning the way of its givenness, without 
which it is impossible to give a full account of life.
The point of this reflection is to offer an authentic testimony to a life 
imbued with (true and transcendent) wisdom. It could be described as 
an intellectual journey from the mere consciousness regarding the da­
tum of life to a full donum of life. In what follows I intend to identify 
the roadmarks of this journey and to describe the main stations of this 
itinerarium by arguing that life in its fullness gives itself to us in and 
through ‘Erlebnis,’ i.e. the immediate vital experience. It is clear that life 
as such discloses itself in conscious experiences. What remains hidden 
perhaps is that it is not the specific content of experience that informs 
about life but rather the form of the encounter: the fact that experiences 
are received and given to us with and through vitality. Before there is 
experience of life (Erfahrung) life is already always there in the vital‑
‑giving ‑itself: Erlebnis.
 6 See on this notion, P. McCormick, The negative sublime, Heidelberg 2003.
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2. The fugitive phenomenon of life 
as data of ‘Experience’ (Erlebnis7)
Concerning the way of its givenness to consciousness life strikes us 
as a very specific phenomenon. Before being a philosophically relevant 
and elaborated term life is always already a lived life; and it is in this way 
that its original givenness is accounted for in consciousness. Any data, 
i.e. any comprehended givenness concerning life as such that could re‑
veal its nature is always embedded in what the German term designates 
as ‘Erlebnis,’ i.e. vital experience. ‘Erlebnis’ means here the most gen‑
eral form of conscious awareness of any object. In this sense life, prior 
to having been reflectively understood and conceptualized, is always 
a conscious awareness of passing events; it is a consciously lived occur‑
rence (Ereignis8).
Life as it is entailed in any ‘vital experience,’ is certainly very fleeting 
for it is difficult to get hold of it as a discreet phenomenon. Let us consider 
 7 It is a well known fact that the German term ‘Erlebnis’ cannot be properly translated 
into English. It means experience, yet in another sense than ‘Erfahrung‘. The difference that is es‑
pecially pertinent for the phenomenological tradition has been elaborated by many. One aspect of 
this difference is of essential importance form y whole paper: the kind of experience I refer here to 
as ‘Erlebnis’ has an immediate connection to how life (in German ‘Leben’) gives itself from itself. 
This relation that escapes for the English language is evident for German speakers and is highly rel‑
evant for understanding God as Life giving oneself through and in every single experience of the 
living being’s consciousness.
  On the difference between Erlebnis and Erfahrung see further, B. Beckmann, Phäno­
menologie des religiösen Erlebnisses. Religionsphilosophische Überlegungen im Anschluss an Adolf 
Reinach und Edith Stein, Würzburg 2003, cap. 1.3. Bedeutungsanalyse des “religiösen Erlebnisses”, 
p. 23–27; see further: R. Schaeffer, Erfahrung als Dialog mit der Wirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung zur 
Logik der Erfahrung, Freiburg 1995, p. 414–481, see especially p. 425 and p. 432.
 8 ‘Ereignis’ or event is one of the key ‑expressions in the philosophy of the later Heidegger. 
See further: M. Heidegger, Das Eregnis (1941/42), Hrsg. F.‑W. v. Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main 
2009 (Gesamtausgabe, 71); M. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, Frankfurt am 
Main 1989 (Gesamtausgabe, 65); see further: on the notion of ‘événement’ in: J. Derrida, La voix 
et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, Paris 1967 
(Collection  Épiméthée); see further: T. Khurana, “…besser, dass etwas geschieht”. Zum Ereignis bei 
Derrida, [in:] Ereignis auf Französisch: von Bergson bis Deleuze, Hrsg. M. Rölli, München 2004, 
p. 235–257.
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then the complex structure of the stream of consciousness by which one 
becomes aware of something! The specific content of an ‘Erlebnis’ is clari‑
fied along the lines of several acts with their corresponding intentional 
objects. However talking about an ‘Erlebnis’ in general terms, life does 
not (necessarily) coincide with the intentional object of the ‘Erlebnis.’ 
Unless, we contemplate life as such, we have rather a lateral consciousness9 
(as opposed to ‘Vollzugsbewusstsein’) of it. In this respect life appears as 
an indirect reference in contrast to the direct presence of the intentional 
object that one thematically focuses on.
In what follows I offer an introductory phenomenological analysis 
of the specific basic forms life as such becomes given to consciousness. 
However distinct these forms might be, there is an underlying unity: 
Life as an original gift. The very giving ‑of ‑life ‑itself has been profoundly 
 9 Von Hildebrand uses this expression in the Die Umgestaltung in Christus (Regensburg 
1971) mentioning that one gets aware of a mental act and an object in radically different ways. Only 
in the latter case may one properly speak about a conscious awareness of something. Our mental ac‑
tivity enfolds in two different dimensions: first as object ‑intentionality, that is grasped in as much as 
one is confronted with the object and perceives its specific features and characteristics as they are re‑
vealed from and by the object. Secondly, the awareness of mental and emotional acts. These are essen‑
tially distinct for they are not objects for the consciousness but rather inner processes of us through 
which we manifest ourselves. See further to the notion of ‘Vollzugsbewußtsein’: D. von Hildebrand, 
Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung, 2. Auflage (unveränderter reprographischer Nachdruck, zusam‑
men mit der Habilitationsschrift “Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis”), Darmstadt 1969, 
p. 1–126, especially p. 8ff.; D. von Hildebrand, Moralia. Nachgelassenes Werk, Regensburg 1980, 
p. 208ff. (Gesammelte Werke, 9); and D. von Hildebrand, Ästhetik, 1. Teil, Stuttgart 1977, p. 32–
40, 49–57 (Gesammelte Werke, 5). Further D. von Hildebrand, Ethik, Stuttgart 1971, p. 202ff., 212, 
242; D. von Hildebrand, Ethics, Chicago 19782, p. 191ff., and D. von Hildebrand, Das Cogito und die 
Erkenntnis der realen Welt. Teilveröffentlichung der Salzburger Vorlesungen Hildebrands (Salzburg, 
Herbst 1964): “Wesen und Wert menschlicher Erkenntnis”: (7. und 8. Vorlesung), “Aletheia” 6/1993–
1994 (1994), p. 2–27; D. von Hildebrand, Transformation in Christ. Our path to holiness, reprint 
of 1948, New Hampshire 1989, ch. 4; D. von Hildebrand, Die Umgestaltung in Christus. Über christ‑
liche Grundhaltung, Regensburg 19715, ch. 4 (Gesammelte Werke, 10). C.f. also Part I of K. Wojtyła, 
The acting person, Boston 1979; the corrected English text of The acting person, Library of the 
International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality Liechtenstein, Internationale Akademie 
für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein, Campus Gaflei. See further J. Seifert, Karol Cardinal 
Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) as philosopher and the Cracow/Lublin School of Philosophy, “Aletheia” 
2 (1981); J. Seifert, Back to “things in themselves”. A phenomenological foundation for classical real­
ism, London 1987, 144ff., 176ff., 181–198, 249ff., 286ff.
114 Mátyás Szalay
investigated by Michel Henry. These rather introductory reflections sup‑
posed to both, pave the way for higher philosophical considerations on 
the nature of life and give a perhaps more thorough image on the relation‑
ship between conscious living and life as archdatum. While Henry rather 
focuses on affectivity and the flesh,10 my main concern is the unity of life 
as logos that is donated. The original meaning of life gets fragmented and 
thus obfuscated precisely because it appears to consciousness in a differ‑
entiated way and without being thematized as such. That is why a certain 
phenomenology of life, i.e. the tracing back of the different appearances 
to its source, is more than a philosophical method: it is an existential con‑
cern of the living human who has to work himself – as Dilthey11 stated 
it – from the elementary understanding of life to a higher, or better to say 
from immediate and savage ‘vital experience’ to sphere of contemplation 
on life as radically higher and more original than himself.
Let us then recall the forms of how life is given in the vital experi‑
ences (Erlebnis)!
2.1. Life ‑world12 as the first reference 
of ‘vital experience’ (Erlebnis)
Within this lateral presence of life we can distinguish different as‑
pects of life’s primordial givenness. By disentangling the meaning of life 
as it is communicated by ‘Erlebnis’ the first distinguishable sense is that 
of a background of the phenomenon in question. By life as background 
 10 M. Henry, Voir l’invisible, [Paris] 1988; M. Henry, Incarnation, Paris 2000.
 11 W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Göttingen 
1992 (Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, 7). Dilthey is not only important in this context for 
this distinction but also and especially for discovering the philosophical relevance of ‘Erlebnis’. It is 
in this context that his observations concerning the degrees and modes of understanding (Verstehen) 
are especially pertinent.
 12 On the notion of Lebenswelt (life ‑world) was first elaborated as early as 1917 by 
E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine 
Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Hrsg. W. Biemel, Nachdruck der 2. verb. Auflage, 
Haag 1976; see further: D. Carr, Husserl’s problematic concept of life ­world, [in:] Husserl: expositions 
and appraisals, eds. F. A. Elliston, P. J. McCormick, Notre Dame 1977.
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I refer here to the meaning ‑context in which the specific sense of the 
given phenomenon gets articulated. Life, prior to getting manifested in 
any specific phenomena, is thus present in all ‘Erlebnis’ as “life ‑world” 
(Lebenswelt). In agreement with Husserl13 we can affirm that life ‑world 
as a horizon is always already pre ‑given and presupposed for any knowl‑
edge. It is important to highlight here the difference between ‘reality’ as 
an abstract philosophical concept on the one hand, and – on the other 
hand – ‘life ‑world’ in its existential sense which is concretized by and 
is the fruit of the basic relations of a lived life, i.e.; a life that extends it‑
self between the inner world of the self and the external reality. In other 
words we do not grasp the external or worldly phenomena neither in 
form of separate, autonomous and neutral units, nor as embedded in 
a supposedly neutral reality, but rather as they appear within the natu­
ral life ­world. The natural life ­world is a correlation of unconstituted 
meaning ‑units. It is therefore, endowed with values and thus requires 
responses (rather than that one should artificially attribute meaning to 
the neutral external reality).
This logos of the natural life ‑world is a vital logos, i.e. a logos that is 
fully permeated by life in both senses. Concerning its accessibility and 
concerning its impact: the relations among meaning ‑units are revealed 
by life and, whenever experimented as truth, engender life in the soul.
 13 “In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coher‑
ent universe of existing objects, we, each ‘I ‑the ‑man’ and all of us together, belong to the world as 
 living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as ex‑
isting precisely through this ‘living together.’ We, as living in wakeful world ‑consciousness, are con‑
stantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world… Obviously this is true not only for 
me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre ‑given in this together, be‑
long, the world as world for all, pre ‑given with this ontic meaning… The we ‑subjectivity… [is] con‑
stantly functioning” (E. Husserl, The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: 
an introduction to phenomenological philosophy, [Evanston] 1970, p. 108–109). Husserl later (p. 133) 
explains that this collective inter ‑subjective pool of perceiving, is both universally present and, for 
humanity’s purposes, capable of arriving at ‘objective truth,’ or at least as close to objectivity as pos‑
sible. The notion of life ‑world plays an essential role in the theory of communication proposed by 
Habermas. See: J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Bd. 1: Handlungsrationalität 
und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, Bd. 2: Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, Frankfurt 
am Main 1981.
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Thus, I mean by life ­world not only ‘reality’ in the ontological sense 
as it is always pre ‑given for any experience, but, by the same token, I also 
mean to designate a dynamic reality.14 From the perceptive of the sub‑
ject’s perception reality as the actual meaning ‑horizon (Sinnhorizont) of 
one’s receptivity unfolds itself dynamically. There is a specific pulsation 
of revealing and veiling of Truth. This ‘becoming explicitly present’ and 
‘fading away to the background’ (without being denied or destroyed) of 
the essential aspects of reality is a par excellence manifestation of life.
One can most clearly observe this phenomenon concerning the way 
reality is represented or better to say, becomes present for the ego through 
the constant shift of the limits of language on a wide scope from ineffabil­
ity in front of a radically new phenomenon, up to the banality of words 
that dilute any original givenness. For language does not only represent 
life by making reference to its events and manifestations but it is itself – 
as organic and vivid reality – an expression of life that both, reveals and 
veils eternal truth within temporality.
The first implication of ‘Erlebnis’ is therefore this dynamic alteration 
of reality (of the world); the analysis of ‘Erlebnis’ explores the forgotten 
aspect of life: despite the changes, there is a reality that is permanent,15 
it is a renewed givenness.16 Analogous to a living ocean, underneath the 
waves there is a ceaseless waving that moves the depth to the surface and 
 14 Due to the fact that any knowing act is directed to a transcendent and objective real‑
ity, life ‑world does not merely refer to a context of any perception in the sense of static givenness.
 15 Do we have a good reason to believe that it is ever ‑lasting? See on this Thomas Aquinas’ 
critique of Aristotle: De aeternitate mundi (On the eternity of the world). “Let us assume, in accor‑
dance with the Catholic faith, that the world had a beginning in time. The question still arises wheth‑
er the world could have always existed, and to explain the truth of this matter, we should first dis‑
tinguish where we agree with our opponents from where we disagree with them. If someone holds 
that something besides God could have always existed, in the sense that there could be something 
always existing and yet not made by God, then we differ with him: such an abominable error is con‑
trary not only to the faith but also to the teachings of the philosophers, who confess and prove that 
everything that in any way exists cannot exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most 
truly has existence” (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas ‑eternity.html, trans. by 1991, 
1997 by Robert T. Miller).
 16 For G. K. Chesterton it is not less of a miracle that the cucumber does not cease to be 
cucumber than an event that apparently contradicts to the laws of nature.
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covers it again. Since one naturally focuses on what exactly the change, 
the new revelation through and in being consists in (as it is reported 
by the ‘Erlebnis’) Life that actually gives rise to this change, that allows 
for it and that provides a certain shift of the horizon, remains unno‑
ticed. Life (Leben) that is revealed in and through the ‘Erlebnis’ is thus 
not the change itself but rather its logical foundation: the world as it is 
full of logos. This fundamental logos, however, bursts its banks, its pres‑
ent determinations (datum) and overwhelms us by revealing a surplus 
of meaning. This ‘basic sense of life,’ this ‘a priori structure of the world’ 
is thus not opposed to alteration and does not exist despite it, but rather 
gives rise to it; it is vivid. – Is it not so that the beauty of the seasons re‑
veal in a more perfect way, eternity, than any false phantasm of deadish 
‘deep ‑frozen time’?
2.2. The inner life of the soul
Let us take a further step by drawing attention to the following fact: 
in order that there be any ‘Erlebnis,’ life is not only presupposed in rela‑
tion to external reality but it is also required that it exist as personal life, 
as the life of my own self. For to know anything, there must be a being 
endowed with life. Moreover, whatever is meaningful for this being, is 
such within the context of its own life. However, it is not sufficient to be 
merely alive with regular life functions to have a ‘vital experience;’ what 
is presupposed by any ‘Erlebnis’ is the life of the self, an inner life, some‑
thing radically distinct from any external relation of the ego for it is the 
specific relation between me as knowing subject and me as the self that is 
co ‑given in any ‘Erlebnis.’
Now, this specific meaning of life as ‘inner dynamism’, even thought it 
is interrelated with ‘life’ that is embodied and actualized in the life ‑world, 
it does not coincide with, and is radically different from that. For the latter 
characterizes the givenness as external reality, thus it focuses on what is 
the core ‑content (creation or the ontological dimension) that is transmit‑
ted by the ‘Erlebnis’, meanwhile the first focuses on the soul as the recipi‑
ent of the ‘donatum’, i.e. to whom (salvation) the content is transmitted.
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Only a soul that naturally experiences itself as urged by an inner dy‑
namic motion to unfold and to realize its inner potentiality, is principally 
able to have any ‘Erlebnis.’17 Changes transmitted through ‘vital experi‑
ence’ are only meaningful for that type of (human) soul that – given its 
dynamic relation to itself – is fundamentally open to and is interested in 
these phenomena.
What does it mean, however, that the soul is related to itself? How 
can we identify and characterize these two poles, between which there 
is vivid tension? To start out with the most radical proposal, the follow‑
ing question should be raised: Is it really the ‘transcendental ego,’ as an 
abstract unity beyond all life ‑world that is united to the ‘constituted self ’ 
within the conscious field as Husserl suggested it (after his transcendental 
turn18)? – I think such an interpretation is misleading for it conceives this 
fundamental inner relation as a link between something that is beyond life 
and something that is in life. It remains, however, nothing but an abstract 
invention for there can hardly be any meaningful experience attributed 
to a lifeless ‘transcendental ego.’ Even if there were any such experience, 
it is enigmatic, why would such an a ­temporal ego – as something op‑
posed to the world and external to the sphere of life – at all be affected 
by or be interested in any ‘Erlebnis’?
Contrary to this idea, what we really have is a conscious data or an 
inner experience of the relations within a complex “I.” This “I” existing 
in time and space, however, is never fully identical with oneself, and is 
never fully realized or even fully present to itself. It is one of the most 
basic human experiences that one is not yet fully that which one should 
be. The ‘lost paradise’ that is to be recovered is, in this respect, far from 
 17 The fact that in the soul is called to respond above all to a supernatural reality does 
not exclude or contradict the fact that it has a natural inner striving to realize itself.
 18 After the publication of his groundbreaking work the Logical investigations, Husserl’s 
philosophy got radicalized in kind of transcendental idealism that tried to reduce every experi‑
ence to a constitutive power of the ‘transcendental ego.’ Most of his students of the Göttingen and 
München ‑school were against this development of phenomenological thinking. For very different 
reasons Heidegger, Scheler, Stein, Reinach, von Hildebrand did not follow their master. Most of 
them insisted on a realism that had been promoted by the early Husserl.
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being a theological invention. It is an account that is supported by ex‑
perience, especially if we think of the most perfect expression of be‑
ing human: love. Both, the difficulties of the full and gratuitous ‘donatio 
suiipsius’ (self ‑gift)19 to another human or divine person, as well as the 
clear desire to do so, give testimony to this essential aspect of ‘conditio 
humana’ that manifests itself in the tension between the two ‘selves’ that 
compose our identity.
The restoration of self (of the past) that is fragmented by a diver‑
gent desire20 is only possible in some future realization. In other words: 
Something of the fundamental meaning of our own existence that is felt 
present through a painful absence. We can only recapture it by project‑
ing ourselves towards future.
The tension is located therefore between the ‘ego’ that is fully immersed 
in life and the ‘ego’ of some future world. The meaning of the latter re‑
mains always transcendent and it is thus a future ‑self that appears on the 
horizon of our deepest desire. The ego of the comparably deficient mean‑
ing is related here to a fully realized future self, to a self of the full life. 
No auto ‑realization of the ego expresses its full nature for the temporal 
limitation of that state. Therefore the self of the full life can’t be conceived 
as anything else but as life free of temporal limitations.
Now, one might ask then whether this idea of a self of full life beyond 
temporality does not contradict our previous statement about the mistake 
of presuming that one pole of the fundamental relation within the soul 
is a ‘transcendental ego.’ This latter case, however, is essentially differ‑
ent. The reason is this: ‘the transcendental ego’ is beyond time, because 
its meaning is completely abstract and its existence is not sustained by 
anything. Thus the existence of such a ‘transcendental ego’ is ultimately 
speaking, questionable. What I propose here instead is an ego ‑pole that 
is not a ‑temporal but rather represents the fullness of time in the sense 
that instead of being void of meaning, its meaning is equally valid for 
 19 See especially on this notion: K. Wojtyła, Love and responsibility, San Francisco 1993.
 20 See on this Saint Augustin, Confessions, book VIII. See also: M. Heidegger, The pheno­
menology of religious life, [Bloomington] 2010.
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all times. Moreover it offers such a fullness of sense for existential ap‑
propriation that cannot be fully realized in time.
This transcendent (as opposed to transcendental) ego ‑pole is referred 
to in an ‘Erlebnis.’ Ultimately speaking any ‘vital experience’ is meaning‑
ful inasmuch as it reveals, transmits and offers for appropriation this full 
sense of life: it is a pre ‑taste of something that we have never tried before 
but yet always desired.
The tension that characterizes the inner life of the soul, in which any 
‘Erlebnis’ is inserted has to be conceived between two real existing ‘selves.’ 
None of these ‘selves’ is a mere abstraction, for both participate in life in 
a however different way, either limited by temporality or not. The one, 
whose identity stems from the past (Gewesenheit), does not exists any 
more at present time, at least not unrelated to the other pole of interpre‑
tation, i.e. to the future self. This latter one embodies the future’s prom‑
ise of a full life.
I would call this future transcendent self an ‘ego of the eschatological 
future’ for it is the culmination of the past desires and yet, at the same 
time, it is radically different from anything that one can possibly imag‑
ine based on past experiences. It refers to the point where the ego be‑
comes fully itself and thus radically different from anything that it has 
ever been before.
This relationship between the self that is actually present to conscious‑
ness as the fruit of past experiences (however fragmented) and the self 
that appears on the horizon of the future (even though it has been al‑
ready announced by the meaningful aspects of the past), simply cannot 
be reduced to the difference between temporal stances of past and future. 
Even if these temporal stances bracket the fugitive present and both are 
eager to absorb its evaporating meaning, it would still be highly inap‑
propriate to talk here about a relationship simply between past and fu‑
ture ego. These stances are more deeply interrelated with one another. 
Anything that is truly meaningful about the past stems precisely from 
the same ‘future’ that one is looking to realize. This ‘future’ that is vis‑
ible as an origin of the past experiences appears in form of a residuum 
of meaning that one has not yet appropriated and which in this sense is 
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transcendent.21 It is precisely this inexhaustible surplus of meaning what 
reveals the eschatological future when our self is going to be fully that 
which it is: the self of the full life. The future possibility of becoming this 
or that self – as communicated by the actual ‘Erlebnis’ – is inasmuch 
perceived as relevant as it helps us to realize this remnant meaning of 
the past experiences.
Any ‘Erlebnis’, according to its nature, appears as an impediment or 
as an incentive for this inner dynamism of realizing one’s personal voca‑
tion to live a full life. There is no ‘vital experience’ if there is no proper 
dynamism that is capable of absorbing the content given through it, i.e. if 
there is no possibility of a future appropriation through reflection. We can 
hardly think of a past ‑self, the subject of different past acts and experiences 
that is not shattered in some way; the identity of such past self ‑identity is 
fragmented and thus naturally looks out for possibilities to get unified. The 
only point of view that promises a new unity is the ‘ego of the eschatologi‑
cal future’ that any ‘Erlebnis’ adequately understood refers to. This deepest 
meaning of ‘Erlebnis’ contains an ego that manifests itself as the possible 
real self endowed with full life; one is called to get converted to this self 
precisely by fully appropriating the transcendent meaning that is offered 
to him by the ‘Erlebnis’ which moves him beyond the subjective horizon.
Thus the second fugitive aspect of life implied in any ‘Erlebnis’ is the 
inner life of the self. This life is ‘Werden’ [becoming] for its meaning is 
already announced but not yet entirely comprehended. What makes the 
self alive is the promise of a full life. Thus the attitude required by any 
‘Erlebnis’ is that of a fundamental affirmation of the disclosed meaning 
and the faithful guarding of the promise it entails. ‘Vital ‑experiences’ 
prompt us to watch out (vigilare) for a fundamental meaning which we 
can build our identity on. They also introduce thereby a tension for al‑
ready bracketing the past ‑self while only pointing to the possibility of 
a future ‑self. Migrating in this “nowhereland” that is not the paradise 
any more, and is not yet heaven either, requires being fully open to and 
 21 J.‑L. Chrétien, The unforgettable and the unhoped for, New York 2002 (Perspectives in 
Continental Philosophy, 26).
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at the disposal of the event by which the promise of a full life can be real‑
ized. Any ‘Erlebnis’ is a mini ‑Odyssey, for we have to leave our house in 
order to find our home.
2.3. ‘Erlebnis’ as an event
In what was said before we approached life, the meaning of which is 
hidden in ‘Erlebnis,’ by making explicit to whom and concerning what 
the ‘Erlebnis’ is given. It is for somebody with a vivid tension to oneself 
and it concerns something that is part of the life ‑world. The third way 
of how life is disclosed within any ‘vital experience’ comes to the fore by 
analyzing the very phenomenon of ‘Erlebnis’ as an event. Thus we turn to 
the question of how life becomes present to consciousness when it gives 
itself in and through ‘Erlebnis.’
‘Erlebnis’ does not only reveal the life ­world and makes reference to 
the real self one is called to be, but prior to all these, it is the primordial 
‘scene’ where the ego gets confronted with reality. ‘Erlebnis’ in this sense 
is the most original form of encounter with what ‘there is’ (il y a; es gibt, 
lo que hay). It is the most original, most immediate and vivid way of how 
Life gives itself.
Philosophers, i.e. anybody truly interested in wisdom, are called to 
look behind what is obvious in order to discover with amazement: this 
‘there is’, what one encounters as exposed and exhibited, gets precisely 
transmitted when lived, i.e. as ‘Erlebnis.’ Reality – as we understand it – 
before the process of the sedimentation of its meaning and becoming 
‘substantial’, i.e. before the aspects belonging to the subject and the object 
get distinguished, simply occurs (to us).
The primary reference of the expression ‘the meaning’ of life therefore 
isn’t an external fact or a state of affairs that could be formulated in a set 
of true ‑claims, but prior to this, it is an occurrence (Ereignis22), some‑
thing that one undergoes and what involves and transforms the subject.
 22 Jean ‑Luc Marion defines ‘Eregnis’, as a saturated phenomenon with certain specif‑
ic features: “Événement, ou phénomène non prévisible (à partir du passé), non exchaustivement 
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Any event when experienced necessarily implies discontinuity within 
the continuous flux; events mark a difference between the states before 
and after and thus they structure the inner time ‑perception. This dis‑
continuity obviously already presupposes some continuity or it is bet‑
ter to say, some permanence of the meaning ‑unites inasmuch as they 
participate in what is the full and all encompassing meaning of all, the 
logos itself they represent. What causes the disruption is the appearance 
of a new givenness, i.e. the self ‑revealing of some meaning beyond ex‑
pectation. This new meaning does not stem from consciousness itself. 
It can’t be (fully and exclusively) the result of the act of constitution, for 
the appearance of such a meaning would right away fit into the flux of 
consciousness and would not qualify as an event, i.e. as something car‑
rying a transcendent meaning. What properly characterizes an event is 
the conscious grasp of the unconstituted core of meaning, i.e. its original 
givenness for consciousness.
If in the process of reflection somebody succeeds tracing back the 
original givenness within the complex meaning ‑unit and concentrates on 
this, i.e. on the act of givenness as such rather than on any other layer 
of meaning, this person will arrive at a certain ‘zero ‑position.’ He will 
witness how Life is giving itself. The event that qualifies an ‘Erlebnis’ in 
contrast to any other phenomenon of consciousness is therefore not the 
appearance of this or that particular meaning but rather the universally 
valid way of how Life gives itself. One catches a glimpse of life through 
tracing back the originality by which a particular meaning is given for 
consciousness.
The very event of coming to existence is what gives a testimony of 
revelation itself, of how Life as such and the full meaning of Life is com‑
municated through the revelation. This event of the most ‘original exteri‑
orization of life’ that underpins all experiences is called by Saint Thomas 
Aquinas “act of being” (actus essendi). It might be even more proper in 
compréhensible (à partir du présent), non reproductible (à partir de future), bref absolu, unique, 
advenant” (J.‑L. Marion, La phénomène saturé, [in:] Phénomenologie et théologie, éd. J.‑F. Courtine, 
Paris 1992, p. 113).
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a certain sense to talk about an ‘act of Life’, for, A.) The meaning we re‑
ceive concerns more than just being (substance); the revelation of being 
refers clearly beyond being (Holy Trinity) and B.) Whatever is revealed 
fills us and the whole life ‑world (reality) with new life, it revives being 
and leads to a rebirth of life ‑world.
That is why at this point the question is not how and what can one ab‑
sorb of the given meaning but rather how one can get transformed in the 
light of the transcendent meaning one participated in. Such transforma‑
tion is possible on the ground of remaining faithful to this unconstituted 
core of the event, to this original givenness beyond any conceptualiza‑
tion, is a difficult existential choice that is not only a real philosophical 
achievement based on moral qualities.
Let me explain here, what I mean by unconstituted core of an event! 
The original givenness (Urgegebenheit) that forms the core of any rel‑
evant ‘Erlebnis’ appears as a meaning that is not established by the con‑
stitutive work of consciousness which Husserl describes as retention and 
protention.23This meaning stems rather, from the unconstituted time 
I previously called the ‘eschatological future.’ The time that is, approach­
es us through the transmission of the different temporal stances (past, 
present, future) as forms of inner time ‑experience.
What qualifies as the unconstituted core is something that has never 
been expected and is beyond all desire or fear; with the expression of Jean‑
‑Louis Chrétien: the unhoped for. It hits us as a surprise. And as such, is 
more real than any fulfillment of previous expectations. What is really 
surprising and is a real event that gives rise to experience, is the sudden 
intuition into givenness as a revelation of things (actus vivendi) as vivid 
superabundance of their meaning beyond all metaphor and concept.
Since any true ‘Erlebnis’ communicates this ‘savage’ and lavish mean‑
ing it appeals to be a new beginning. (i.e. It is not yet conceptualized and 
culturally, not elaborated It has an original givenness that is transcendent 
to consciousness if this meaning is profound and relevant enough for the 
 23 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Hrsg. R. Boehm, Haag 
1966 (Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, 10), especially § 11–13, § 16, § 19, § 24.
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subject). Any relevant ‘Erlebnis’ thus goes against both, the philosophi‑
cal and the existential pretension, according to which there is no real 
original meaning, nothing to be surprised or puzzled about: the eternal 
return of the same.
At the same time it also destroys the (mechanistic) view of a life that 
presupposes: life is determined by the past. For ‘Erlebnis’ as such clearly 
communicates that the future is not a fruit or a consequence of the past 
but it stems from a radically different source beyond subjective time‑
‑experience: eschatological future.
What makes possible a new start for the subject of an ‘Erlebnis,’ the 
rebirth as a gratuitous existence, is a fundamental disposition towards 
reality as received from the (eschatological) future, source of all given‑
ness. Such a fundamental attitude gives rise to an act of withholding the 
natural inclination to absorb the original givenness of the meaning by 
leaving out of consideration how it suspends the validity of all previous 
interpretation. It is a resistance of the temptation of the datum to forget 
the donum, that indeed is susceptible to give a radically new direction of 
any desire and future projection.
3. The unity of life experience
Above I described the three distinct forms how we experience life: as 
the meaning horizon, i.e. as life ‑world, as the inner life of the soul and 
as events, in which life occurs.
However different these forms of life’s self ‑manifestation might be they 
are deeply interrelated and their unity is more than relevant to understand 
what life “is” and how it gets donated. These forms are truly inseparable 
in the sense that no experience can be truly perceived or understood 
when not simultaneously co ‑given in these forms. In other words, these 
dimensions of life are co ‑constitutive for any meaning that life might have.
For no meaning of life can possibly be discovered without a meaning‑
‑horizon of life, without that life is always already accounted for as a ba‑
sic and fundamental meaning that becomes explicit in form of the actual 
event ‑encounter.
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Secondly, any event ‑encounter needs to be perceived to be recog‑
nized as life. A life ‑world as meaning ‑horizon of life and a life as event‑
‑encounter make only sense if there is a corresponding awareness, i.e. in‑
ner life of the soul for which life manifests itself.
Thirdly life shows itself from itself as an event; life already always oc‑
curs and it is this that allows for the existence of a life ‑world as well as 
that of the inner ‑life that consciously participates in this occurring of life 
itself. The event character of life reveals how contingent life truly is; it 
happens and one cannot sufficiently be amazed that it keeps on occurring. 
At the same time this event character is essential to the kind of life that 
is disclosed for us: the life beyond temporality that becomes temporal.
It is certain that the meaning of the unity of these three dimensions 
of life’s own self ‑disclosure to consciousness is a true mystery. This does 
not mean that life as an original gift is inaccessible. Rather it means that 
even if a full comprehension is only possible through the beatific vision, 
life is always already disclosed to us in a fragmented way. The basic frag‑
mentation is due to these three dimensions that are hard to be focused 
and reflected on simultaneously.
Moreover, this fragmentation is even more intense for the fact that 
the self ‑disclosure of life in these three dimensions is perceived within 
the inner life of the soul from a certain point of view that entails some 
concrete expectations. Life is mostly, though not exclusively, given in in‑
tentional experiences in which it is not explicitly thematized as such. In 
order to recover the unity of the meaning of life, the very data of life has 
to be made to an object of contemplation. The contemplative apprecia‑
tion of life focuses on its gift ‑character as it is most clearly given through 
experiences in which life as such is thematically present. In other words: 
Life as an original gift is primarily accessible in experiences in which the 
life can be retraced to its origin.
Summary
On our itinerary from the data of life to the full acknowledgment 
of life as gift we accomplished merely the first part. After overcoming 
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the perhaps greatest hermeneutical ‑existential impediment, namely 
evil as privatio vitae, we shed some light on the basic structure of ex‑
perience (Erlebnis) concerning the tacit and ongoing self ‑disclosure of 
life in its threefold ‑structure. Once this structure is clarified one can 
consider its underlying unity and thereby could access the full mean‑
ing of life. This task requires further analysis of experiences in which 
life is thematically given – a task to be realized in the second part of 
this investigation.
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